Nouri al-Maliki was the Prime Minister of Iraq from 2006 to 2014. His sectarian Shia orientation alienated Sunni populations and pushed them toward armed opposition. The chapter discusses how his government’s policies contributed to the conditions that allowed the Islamic State to emerge.
Maliki’s leadership was marked by a strong alignment with Shia political and religious groups, which further marginalized the Sunni population in Iraq. This sectarian divide was exacerbated by the power-sharing arrangements imposed by the American occupation, which favored Shia groups and weakened the Sunni political class. As a result, Sunni communities increasingly turned to armed resistance, creating an environment in which extremist groups like the Islamic State could gain traction.
The chapter highlights how Maliki’s government, in conjunction with the broader American occupation strategy, created the conditions for the rise of the Islamic State. His policies, combined with the American de-Baathification process and the dissolution of the Iraqi military, left a power vacuum that was eventually filled by extremist groups. The Islamic State’s emergence was thus not an isolated event but a direct consequence of decisions made by American officials, including Paul Bremer, and the political structures established during the occupation.
Maliki’s tenure also saw the continued presence of American military forces in Iraq, which were justified by counterterrorism objectives. However, these operations often produced new targets for American intervention, perpetuating a cycle of conflict that has persisted for over two decades.
Related: masud.md, intervention.md